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THE RESPONSE TO BRECHEEN V. REYNOLDS:
OKLAHOMA'S SYSTEM FOR EVALUATING EXTRARECORD CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS IN DEATH
PENALTY CASES
Jeremy B. Lowrey*
Post-conviction counsel are creative lawyers. Just as they
found a way to force this Court to "analyze" a substantive
claim under the guise of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel, so here will they figure out a way to present
sufficient evidence in support of their claim to necessitate a
remand for an evidentiary hearing and possible relief.'
This article focuses specifically on the breakdown of
Oklahoma's system for evaluation of claims based on facts
outside the traditional appellate record, but the article's primary
goal is to use this discussion to more broadly illustrate the
dangers inherent in the current movement in both federal
statutes and caselaw to limit evaluation of state court decisions
on extra-record claims. As the commentary of Judge Lumpkin of
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals quoted above shows,
reviewing courts often approach these claims as an evil to be
avoided whenever possible. These claims include denial of
constitutionally effective counsel, conflicts of interest, failure by
the State to disclose exculpatory evidence, and other claims
based on facts not necessarily directly focused on the issue of

* Jeremy Lowrey is the former deputy chief of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense
System's Capital Post-Conviction Division.
1. Walker v. State, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 3, 13, 933 P.2d 327, 343 (Lumpkin, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) ("Jack Dale Walker"). [Editor's Note: Because Oklahoma is
one of the states employing a system of public domain citation, this article provides parallel
citations to both the Oklahoma official public domain citation and the regional reporter. To
learn more about public domain citations, see Coleen M. Barger, The Uncertain Status of
Citation Reform: An Updatefor the Undecided, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PRocEss 59 (1999).]
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guilt or innocence, 2 but rather on the validity of the process by
which a determination of guilt or innocence was made.
I. OKLAHOMA'S INITIAL REFUSAL TO CONSIDER SYSTEMIC
CHALLENGES TO CAPITAL CONVICTIONS

From 1994 to 1998, one of the cases cited most often in
capital post-conviction briefs filed by Oklahoma defense
attorneys was Brecheen v. Reynolds.' Brecheen was cited, not
because it was a successful case for the defendant involved-it
was not-but because in Brecheen the Tenth Circuit responded
to a long-standing refusal of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals to evaluate systemic constitutional challenges to
convictions in death penalty cases.4 The Brecheen court's
findings succinctly summarize the dilemma facing a capital
defendant under Oklahoma law at the time the case was decided:
[Mr. Brecheen] did not have an opportunity to develop
any additional facts relating to trial counsel's performance
in the direct review process since evidentiary hearingsare
unavailable at the appellate level. He was, however given
this opportunity when he filed his post-conviction petition,
and his claim was ultimately denied on the merits after
hearing. Yet on appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals
refused to review this claim on the merits, even after
hearing had taken place, because it concluded the claim
was waived for not having been raised on direct appeal.
While this determination provides an "independent" state
law ground for rejecting this claim, we do not believe it is
an adequate basis. The practical effect of this ruling is to
force Mr. Brecheen either to raise this claim on direct
appeal, with new counsel but without the benefit of
additional fact-finding, or have the claim forfeited under
state law. This Hobson's choice cannot constitute an
adequate state ground under the controlling case law

2. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963).
3. 41 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1994).
4. See id.; see also Brecheen v. Reynolds, 1992 Okla. Crim. App. 42, 835 P.2d 117;
but see Wilhoit v. State, 1991 Okla. Crim. App. 50, 816 P.2d 545 (affirming a district court
decision granting relief in a capital case in post-conviction proceedings on grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel).
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because it deprives Mr. Brecheen of any meaningful review
of his ineffective assistance claim.'

Even in the wake of the Brecheen decision, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals often refused to consider systemic
constitutional challenges such as ineffective assistance of
counsel that were raised in the first instance in post-conviction
proceedings. The court developed a jurisprudence dealing with
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, juror misconduct,
Brady violations, and other claims requiring extra-record fact
finding, that required significant guesswork on the part of
counsel to determine where those claims were to be raised. In
Pickens v. State, the court held that if a court in post-conviction
proceedings found that the claims (even ineffectiveness claims)
could have been resolved without recourse to extra-record facts,
the claims were waived if not raised in direct appeal
proceedings. 6 However, if direct appeal counsel raised record5. Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1364 (emphasis added).
6. See Pickens v. State, 1996 Okla. Crim. App. 6, 1 17-18, 910 P.2d 1063, 1068-69, in
which the court responded to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel brought on postconviction:
Appellant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel both at trial and on direct
appeal. Appellant could have raised the issue of ineffective trial counsel on
direct appeal; however, the State urges us to address the issue, citing Brecheen v.
Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, _ U.S. __, 115 S.Ct.
2564, 132 L.Ed.2d 817 (1995).
This we refuse to do. The pertinent language in the Brecheen case reads:
This need to give a meaningful opportunity to assess and develop a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, coupled with the fact that such claims
may require an opportunity to develop additional facts, compel the
conclusion that "ineffective assistance claims may be brought for the first
time collaterally." (Citations omitted). Osborn [v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612
(10th Cir. 1988)] indicates that this result is dictated by the interplay of two
factors: the need for additional fact-finding, along with the need to permit
the petitioner to consult with separate counsel on appeal in order to obtain
an objective assessment as to trial counsel's performance.
Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1363-64. While we recognize there may be instances where
additional fact-finding is necessary to fully develop a claim of ineffective trial
counsel, this case is not one where that occurred. And, while we recognize the
Tenth Circuit's generous interpretation of its own review provisions, we refuse
to sacrifice our post-conviction laws and case-law on the altar of one-stop
convenience. Rather, we shall continue to do what we have done in the past:
review each case on its individualmerits, examining each specific propositionin
connection with the specific facts of each case as that need arises. See Berget v.
'State, 907 P.2d 1078, _ (Okl.Cr. 1995); Sellers v. State, 889 P.2d 895 , 897
(Okl.Cr.), cert. denied, _

U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 214, 133 L.Ed.2d 146 (1995).

See also Clayton v. State, 1995 Okla. Crim. App. 3, 5, 892 P.2d 646, 651; Smith v. State,
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based claims of ineffective trial counsel, the court refused to
permit any claim of ineffectiveness to be raised in postconviction, holding that the issue of ineffectiveness itself was
res judicata, regardless of the need for extra-record fact
development, and regardless of whether there was a different
underlying basis for the ineffectiveness claim brought in postconviction. This was so even though the facts supporting such a
claim could be raised for the first time only in post-conviction
proceedings, and even though there was no other state court
forum in which those claims could be litigated.8
The obvious problem with the court's "refus [al] to sacrifice
our post-conviction laws and case-law on the altar of one-stop
convenience" 9 was that it provided neither appellate counsel nor
post-conviction counsel with any guidance for determining
when the court would find that ineffectiveness claims would be
determined to be "resolvable" on the record alone. Perhaps even
more importantly, the Pickens rule meant that no forum was
available at all in which to litigate extra-record issues of
ineffectiveness of counsel where both record-based and extrarecord-based claims of ineffectiveness existed in the same case,
and where direct appeals counsel raised the record-based claims
on direct appeal.
In response to the problems created by Brecheen, in 1995
the Oklahoma legislature and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals undertook to make sweeping changes in the methods by
which extra-record claims were evaluated in capital cases.
There is no question that the Oklahoma court was fully aware of
the Brecheen ruling when it was implementing its new standards
for evaluating claims of ineffective counsel. Brecheen was
1996 Okla. Crim. App. 13,

13, 915 P.2d 927, 931 (Lumpkin, J., concurring). In Berget,

cited above by the court, the court went so far as to contend, despite the specific provisions
of the court rules in effect at the time, that extra-record claims could in fact be developed in
direct appeal proceedings. Berget v. State, 1995 Okla. Crim. App. 66 20, 907 P.2d 1078,
1084.

7. See Moore v. State, 1995 Okla. Crim. App. 12, 12, 889 P.2d 1253, 1253 n.3; see
also Fowler v. State, 1995 Okla. Crim. App. 29, 896 P.2d 566.
8. At the time of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Brecheen, the Oklahoma Criminal
Procedure Rules relating to direct appeals explicitly prohibited "supplementation of the

record with evidentiary materials which could have been introduced in the trial court but
were not." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 App., § 3.11 (West 1986). Supplementation with any
other material was limited to "the rare case of extreme necessity." Id.
9. Pickens, 1996 Okla. Crim. App. 6,

17-18, 910 P.2d at 1068-69.

THE RESPONSE TO BRECHEEN V. REYNOLDS

highly visible in opinions in which the court justified the
changes that had been made in post-conviction procedure. In
Braun v. State, the court stated:
We are painfully aware that at least one federal court has,
in the past, viewed this Court as inconsistent in the
application of its rules, and as a result deemed our ruling of
waiver as insufficient to establish a procedural bar on
habeas review. See Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343
(10th Cir.1994), cert. denied,_ U.S. - , 115 S.Ct. 2564,
132 L.Ed.2d 817 (1995). 10

II. CAPITAL POST-CONVICTION REDEFINED
In 1995, a series of changes to Oklahoma procedure were
initiated, beginning with the enactment of significant
amendments to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act.' These
changes radically changed the methods by which issues could be
raised in capital appeals and post-conviction proceedings, and
they also significantly limited the time frames in which those
issues could be raised. The changes in the Post-Conviction
Procedure Act, set out below, were limited to post-conviction
proceedings in capital cases.2

10. Braun v. State, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 26, 1 9, 937 P.2d 505, 508.
11. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1089 (West Supp. 2000).
12. Id. Post-conviction proceedings in non-capital cases in Oklahoma continue to be
governed by language of the prior post-conviction procedure act. See OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1080 (West 1986). Oklahoma's statutory distinction between capital and noncapital cases raises an entirely different set of Eighth Amendment concerns which fall
outside the scope of this article. Where different post-conviction standards apply to capital
and non-capital cases, and where the standards applicable to capital cases are as restrictive
as those detailed here, the question arises as to whether Eighth Amendment concerns of
reliability have been protected. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1982); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 635-37 (1980). Distinctions between the methods by which capital
and non-capital post-conviction proceedings are handled in Oklahoma include the fact that
non-capital applications are still brought in the first instance in district court with the court
of criminal appeals acting as an appellate court in those proceedings. In addition, noncapital defendants are not required by controlling caselaw to raise "available" ineffective
assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal where the same attorney handles both trial
and appeal. Non-capital petitioners are also permitted to file after the completion of direct
appeal.
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A. New ProceduralRules Establishedby the 1995 Amendments
The revision to the act itself made numerous changes to the
methodology for evaluating extra-record issues in capital cases.
Those changes included requirements that post-conviction
petitions be filed in the first instance in the court of criminal
appeals (rather than in district court, as required under the prior
statute) and imposition of deadlines that required filing of postconviction auplications prior to the completion of direct appeal
proceedings.
In addition, the amendments contained new statutory
language limiting issues that can be raised on post-conviction.
Under the terms of the amendments, the only issues that can be
raised in post-conviction proceedings in capital cases are those
that (1) were not and could not have been raised in a direct
appeal; and (2) support a conclusion either that the outcome of
the trial would have been different but for the errors or that the
defendant is factually innocent."
The provisions of these paragraphs do not establish
standards of review for the issues raised, but instead establish
the minimal showing that must be made before a claim brought
in post-conviction proceedings is even subject to review. These
threshold standards are themselves much higher than the
constitutional standards of review that should apply to
substantive evaluation of many of the constitutional claims that
would traditionally be raised in post-conviction proceedings; 5
however, the primary impact of these standards in Oklahoma has
13. Under the 1995 act, post-conviction applications in capital cases must be filed
within 90 days of the filing of the final brief on direct appeal. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22, § 1089(D)(1) (West Supp. 2000). From a practice standpoint, it is important to note that
if no reply brief is filed on direct appeal, the time for filing runs from the date on which the
State's response is filed, not from the prospective deadline date for filing a reply.
14. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1089(C) (West Supp. 2000).

15. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980) (holding that "a
defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his
representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief"); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring reversal where constitutionally deficient
performance of counsel results in trial whose outcome is "unreliable"); Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68 (1985) (applying harmless error analysis to question of denial of expert
assistance at trial). Thus, whatever the constitutional error, few if any errors are subjected
to as strenuous an evaluation as that required by the language of Oklahoma statute, which
by its terms requires proof that the outcome of trial would have been different-not simply
a determination of whether trial was impacted or its result is unreliable.
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been on the court's evaluation of claims of ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel. This is so because the court of criminal
appeals' reinterpretation of the "record on appeal" 16 has meant
that few, if any, other claims reach a paragraph two evaluation.
B. The Court as Advocate
Another significant change was made in Oklahoma
procedure when the 1995 amendments were enacted. In all but
the most exceptional of cases, the State no longer even
participates in post-conviction review. The amendments to
section 1089 contain no specific provision relating to a response
from the State in post-conviction proceedings, and the court of
criminal appeals has generally refused to require a response.17
Instead, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals serves both as
8
arbiter and as advocate for the State.'
C. The Oklahoma Court of CriminalAppeals'
Reinterpretationof the 1995 Amendments
In analyzing the terms of the 1995 amendments to
Oklahoma's post-conviction statutes, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals placed a significantly different interpretation
on the statutory language than the interpretation that might be
arrived at by simply reading the terms of the statute as they have
traditionally been understood.,9

16. See discussion infra Part C(1).
17. The court has held that the provisions of title 22, section 1089(D)(3) of the
Oklahoma Statutes govern responses, and it has denied requests by petitioners that the
State be required to respond. See Gilbert v. State, 1998 Okla. Crim. App. 17, IN 17-18, 955
P.2d 727, 733; Charm v. State, 1998 Okla. Crim. App. 2, 15, 953 P.2d 47, 51.
18. At present the writer is aware of only two reported capital post-conviction cases
under the new amendments in which a response was requested from the State: McGregor v.
State, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 10, 935 P.2d 332 and Slaughter v. State, 1998 Okla. Crim.
App. 63, 969 P.2d 990.
19. Indeed, the court's holding in Walker was so counterintuitive that it directly
conflicted with the court's first two decisions under the statute, which addressed the
"appellate record" as it has been traditionally understood. See Walker v. State, 1997 Okla.
Crim App. 3, 7, 933 P.2d 327, 332; Medlock v. State, 1996 Okla. Crim. App. 58, 927
P.2d 1069; Spears v. State, 1996 Okla. Crim. App. 44, 924 P.2d 778.
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1. The Re-Definition of the "Appellate Record"-Walker v.
State
In Walker v. State,20 the Oklahoma court appeared to have
finally made a determination as to the forum in which it would
require future extra-record claims to be raised in Oklahoma. In
order to conform its determination with the language of the
statute, the court in Walker redefined the term "appellate
record" to include any facts that "were available to Walker's
direct appeal attorney and thus either were or could have been
used in his direct appeal." 2 In application, the court found that
facts contained in affidavits that were included in Walker's postconviction application in support of claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, while "not physically part of Walker's
direct appeal record" were "available to his direct appeal
attorney and thus could have been argued on direct appeal."" By
so holding, the Walker court virtually eliminated any mechanism
through which claims of ineffective trial counsel could be
brought in post-conviction proceedings, because, with few
exceptions, facts developed in post-conviction proceedings
could have been developed through investigation by direct
appeal counsel. 3
In addition to redefining the "appellate record" to include
extra-record facts, the court developed new standards for
evaluation of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. In establishing those standards, the court determined
that petitioners must establish deficient performance "as a
precondition to having their underlying claim reviewed." 2 4 The
court lamented that under the prior post-conviction scheme,
which required Strickland analysis of ineffectiveness claims, the
"[c]ourt was essentially forced to examine the merits of the
allegedly mishandled but technically waived claim in order to
20. 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 3, 933 P.2d 327.
21. Id. 1 7, 933 P.2d at 332.
22. Id.
23. The court has applied the same "appellate record" analysis to other types of extrarecord claims in addition to those for ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Richie v.
State, 1998 Okla. Crim. App. 26, 957 P.2d 1192 (claims of juror bias waived); Cargle v.
State, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 63, 947 P.2d 584 (waiving prosecutorial misconduct claims,
Brady claims, and juror misconduct claims).
24. Walker, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 12, 933 P.2d at 334.
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determine whether it was so serious as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial."25 The court found that its new test permitted
analysis of deficient performance without an examination of the
merits of the underlying claim. What the court did not provide
was any explanation of how deficient performance could in fact
be shown without reference to the issue that gave rise to the
claim of deficient performance in the first place.
2. Changes in the "Intervening Change in Law" Standard

Under the prior incarnation of Oklahoma's post-conviction
procedure act, Oklahoma had consistently permitted postconviction claims where those claims were based on an
"intervening change in law." The Oklahoma court had held that
an intervening change in the law constituted a sufficient reason
for why an issue could not have been raised on direct appeal.27
However, the provisions of the new amendments to the act have
been interpreted by the Oklahoma court as superseding the prior
standard and permitting issues to be raised as "intervening
changes of law" in the most limited of circumstances.28
25. Id. 12, 933 P.2d at 334.
26. For a more detailed discussion of the constitutional problems inherent in the
Oklahoma court's new standards for evaluation of claims of appellate ineffectiveness, see
Brian Lester Dupler, The Inglorious Revolution: Walker v. State and Capital PostConviction Procedure,68 OKLA. B.J. 2624 (1997); Jennifer Golm, Note, Walker v. State,
Dooming Challenges to Appellate Counsel'sEffectiveness, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 601 (1998).
27. See Fowler v. State, 1995 Okla. Crim. App. 29, 5, 896 P.2d 566, 570 (holding that
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994), which was decided after the defendant's direct
appeal and after his first application for post-conviction relief was at issue, constituted an
intervening change in law and allowed the defendant to assert for the first time that the
State had systematically and unconstitutionally excluded female jurors); see also Van
Woundenberg v. State, 1991 Okla. Crim. App. 104, 1 2, 818 P.2d 913, 915; Stafford v.
State, 1991 Okla. Crim. App. 77, 2, 815 P.2d 685, 687 (holding that while the Supreme
Court's decision in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), was based upon
principles of law previously announced in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980),
Cartwright still constituted an intervening change in law because the constitutionality of
the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance "was not
definitively decided until addressed by the Supreme Court in Cartwright").
28. In Walker v. State, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 31, 940 P.2d 509 (" Gary Alan Walker")
(the appeal of Gary Alan Walker, not to be confused with the appeal of Jack Dale Walker,
Walker v. State, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 3, 933 P.2d 327 ("Jack Dale Walker"), the opinion
generally discussed in this section) the Oklahoma court held that the amendments to the
Post-Conviction Procedure Act permitted a claim to be brought in post-conviction
proceedings as an intervening change in law only if "the legal ground supporting it either
was not recognized by a court as precedent at the time of his direct appeal or is a new rule
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3. Requirements thatAttorneys Raise Ineffectiveness Claims on
Themselves
In Neill v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
determined that
[n]o exception is made in the statute for the situation where
trial counsel and appellate counsel are the same. Therefore,
as the information forming the basis of [Mr. Neill's] claims
was available to direct appeal counsel ... [Mr. Neill's]
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is waived
because it could have been raised on direct appeal but was
not.29
4. Retroactive Application of the New Standards

In both Walker cases, in Neill, and in many other cases
decided after Jack Dale Walker v. State, the Oklahoma court
applied the waiver rules established in Jack Dale Walker to
cases that had been briefed and in some instances decided on
direct appeal prior to the passage of the amendments to the post-

conviction procedure act and the decision in Jack Dale Walker.30
In reviewing the state court's decision in Gary Walker's case,
of constitutional law which has been given retroactive effect. Gary Alan Walker, 1997
Okla. Crim. App. 31 3, 940 P.2d at 510 (quoting Jack Dale Walker, 1997 Okla. Crim.
App. 3, 933 P.2d at 339). The court determined that the petitioner's claims under Cooper
v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), did not meet either of these exceptions and were
therefore waived. In Jack Dale Walker, Judge Lane dissented with regard to an equivalent
finding, writing:
The majority finds that both of these issues were waived because they were not
raised on direct appeal. I believe that the majority has incorrectly interpreted
[OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1089 (West Supp. 2000).] ... The majority does
not cite, nor do I find any cases that determined either of these issues [Cooper
and Flores v. State, 896 P.2d 558 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)] prior to the time that
Petitioner filed his appellate brief.... [I]t would be very difficult for us to say
that the [Cooper] claim could have been reasonably formulated from one of our
prior decisions.
Jack Dale Walker, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 3, 2, 933 P.2d 327, 334 (Lane, J., dissenting).
29. 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 41, 7, 943 P.2d 145, 148, 151. But see id. 1 1, 943 P.2d at
151 (Chapel, J., concurring) (although concurring in the result, Judge Chapel contended
that the majority's requirement that counsel raise ineffectiveness claims on themselves
"absurd").
30. See, e.g., McGregor v. State, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 10, 935 P.2d 332; Valdez v.
State, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 12, 933 P.2d 931 (Lane, J., dissenting) (finding that he
"would remand this case to the trial court for a proper determination of competency for the
same reasons [he] dissented in [JackDale] Walker").
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the Tenth Circuit held that the state court's decision to apply the
new waiver rules to Gary Walker constituted an impermissible
retroactive application of those rules. 3
D. Changes in DirectAppeal Procedure
In addition to the changes made in post-conviction
procedure by the legislature and court, the court of criminal
appeals made changes in Oklahoma Criminal Appellate Rule
3.11, which relates to supplementation of the record on direct
appeal.32 The new rule permitted supplementation of the record
where the direct appeal contained an allegation of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel, and where that allegation "is
predicated upon an allegation of failure of trial counsel to
properly utilize available evidence or adequately investigate to
identify evidence which could have been made available during
the course of trial."33 The rule also established a threshold for
obtaining an evidentiary hearing based on this type of
ineffectiveness claim requiring that "the application and
affidavits must contain sufficient information to show this Court
by clear and convincing evidence there is a strong possibility
trial counsel was ineffective." 3 The modified rule does not
contain any provision for supplementation of the record for any
other type of extra-record constitutional claim.
III. PROCEDURES

HAVING THE FORM OF CONSTITUTIONALITY,
BUT DENYING THE POWER

From the foregoing discussion, several conclusions may be
drawn concerning Oklahoma's current procedure for evaluation
of extra-record claims. First, there is still no readily available
forum in which extra-record claims can be litigated on their

31. See Walker v. Attorney Gen., 167 F.3d 1339 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Fields v.
Calderon, 125 F.3d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1997). The Tenth Circuit remarked that "[a]
defendant cannot be expected to comply with a procedural rule that does not exist at the
time, and should not be deprived of a claim for failing to comply with a rule that only
comes into being after the time for compliance has passed." Id. at 1345.
32. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 App. § 3.11 (West Supp. 2000).
33. Id. § 3.11(B)(3)(b).
34. Id.
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merits in state court proceedings. Instead, petitioners are forced
to litigate their claims in terms of the threshold requirements for
obtaining evidentiary hearings, and except in rare cases where
such hearings have been granted, those claims do not receive
any further review.35 Indeed, the court is generally utilizing the
evidentiary hearings to maintain the same record review/extrarecord review dichotomy that was present in the prior postconviction waiver scheme. The only difference is that while
once the court used the terms "waiver" and "res judicata" to
justify its determination not to review extra-record claims on
their merits, it now uses rule 3.11's threshold requirements,
denying evidentiary hearings without factual analysis, and
otherwise remaining silent with regard to the specific claims for
which a hearing was requested. 36 The court continues to address
record-based claims of ineffectiveness, but only in very rare
cases has the court actually conducted a substantive analysis of
extra-record ineffectiveness claims.37 In addition, the amended
statute and amended court rules make no provision for raising
other extra-record claims outside of ineffective assistance of
counsel. In Jack Dale Walker, the court urged the "importance
of the direct appeal as the mechanism for raising all potentially
meritorious claims., 38 However, the court has provided only
limited mechanisms for raising those claims in direct appeals
proceedings. Further, recent caselaw indicates that the court
fully intends to circumscribe even more severely the availability
of avenues in direct appeal proceedings for raising such claims.
In Anderson v. State, the court denied a request for evidentiary
hearing on an issue of juror misconduct and found that the claim
35. See Thornburg v. State, 1999 Okla. Crim. App. 32, 985 P.2d 1234; Short v. State,
1999 Okla. Crim. App. 15, 94, 980 P.2d 1081, 1108. The impact of the refusal of the
court to grant evidentiary hearings is twofold: First, development of factual evidence to
support a petitioner's claims is severely limited, and second, the refusal of the grant often

ends the court's inquiry, as it did in these cases. No further formal finding on the
underlying merits of a petitioner's constitutional claims is made. The point here is not that

merits-based review is not afforded when evidentiary hearings are granted, see, e.g.,
Phillips v. State, 1999 Okla. Crim. App. 38, 989 P.2d 1017, but that, when those hearings
are not granted, neither are constitutional standards applied to the extra-record-based
claims of ineffectiveness.
36. See, e.g., Thornburg, 1999 Okla. Crim. App. 32, 29, 985 P.2d at 1245; Short,

1999 Okla.Crim. App. 15, 1 96, 980 P.2d at 1108.
37. See Washington v. State, 1999 Okla. Crim. App. 22, 989 P.2d 960.
38. Jack Dale Walker, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 3,

5, 933 P.2d at 331.
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was waived because it was filed outside the statutory deadline
under which a motion for new trial could be filed.39
The net effect of the radical changes made in Oklahoma's
methodology for evaluation of extra-record claims has been to
provide a new method for achieving the same result as that
reached by the court of criminal appeals in Brecheen. Extrarecord claims remain unexamined under constitutional standards
in many direct appeals cases, instead being disposed of without
consideration on the merits of the underlying claims by recourse
to the threshold requirements for evidentiary hearins or through
application of new, even earlier, findings of waiver.
The court has returned to its stated goal of achieving a
system in which it can evaluate cases on a "case-by-case" basis,
without regard to what it considers "liberal" rules that permit
equivalent issues to be considered in all cases. The court has
made it even more difficult to "figure out a way to present
sufficient evidence in support of [a] claim to necessitate a
remand for an evidentiary hearing and possible relief.",4 ' Far
from solving the problems identified in Brecheen, the Oklahoma
system has simply recharacterized its treatment of the claims
that the Brecheen opinion was written to protect. Extra-record
claims, when they are considered at all, are considered in a
haphazard fashion, devoid of predictability, and dependent not
on established procedural rules, but on the interest the court may
have in addressing, or failing to address, a particular extrarecord claim in a given case. Further, by re-couching evaluation
of claims in terms of the threshold requirements, the court has
created a mechanism under which actual evaluation of
constitutional claims can be avoided while still presenting the
appearance of a substantive evaluation of the claim. This
appearance of substantive review, rather than denial of process,
is particularly important when the implications on federal review
are considered.
39. 1999 Okla. Crim. App. 44, 992 P.2d 409. It is clear from the court's opinion that
appellate counsel, faced with the ambiguity of the court's rules relating to supplementation
of the record filed both a motion for new trial, and a request for an evidentiary hearing in
direct appeal proceedings. Id. 160, 992 P.2d at 425. The court did not even affirmatively
address the evidentiary hearing request in finding that the issue was waived.
40. See id.
41. Jack Dale Walker, 1997 Okla. Crim. App. 3,

concurring).

13, 933 P.2d at 343 (Lumpkin, J.,
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IV. THE OPTIONS FOR FEDERAL CORRECTIVE ACTION
The commentary made by Judge Lumpkin in his
concurrence in Jack Dale Walker, quoted at the beginning of
this article, was made in the context of a critique of the
majority's decision to reinterpret Oklahoma's method of
evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims. It was not
Judge Lumpkin's concern that the majority's method would bar
defendants from review of their claims, but rather that the
majority's method might result in "a test for ineffective
assistance of counsel which is actually more lenient for postconviction than it is for direct appeal., 42 Given Oklahoma's
current methods for dealing with extra-record claims, including
ineffectiveness of counsel claims, it seems that Judge Lumpkin's
fears were unfounded, but it is the existence of those fears
themselves that is troubling.
The Oklahoma court has demonstrated a clear intention, not
simply to deny claims of systemic failure, but to deny petitioners
a predictable forum in which those claims can be litigated. The
remedy for such a situation would be to provide a forum in
federal court in which the claims could be brought as de novo
federal claims in habeas corpus.43 In Oklahoma's case, the Tenth
Circuit in the past has shown a willingness to protect the
procedural avenues for raising constitutional claims where they
are denied in state court proceedings." Where the circuit has
been less protective, however, is with regard to the nature of the
substantive evaluation that is given to claims on their merits by
the state court, regardless of the actual nature of the
constitutional analysis conducted.
42. Id. 1 12, 933 P.2d at 343.
43. See Berget v. Gibson, 188 F.3d 518 (10th Cir. 1999) (table) (for text, see Berget,
No. 98-6381, 1999 WL 586986 (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 1999); Hickman v. Spears, 160 F.3d
1269, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998).
44. Walker v. Attorney Gen., 167 F.3d 1339, 1345 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that "[a]
defendant cannot be expected to comply with a procedural rule that does not exist at the
time, and should not be deprived of a claim for failing to comply with a rule that only
comes into being after the time for compliance has passed"); English v. Cody, 146 F.3d
1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998) (raising "serious questions about the adequacy of the actual
Oklahoma procedural mechanism" for evaluation of extra-record ineffective assistance of
counsel claims on direct appeal); Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1363 (10th Cir.
1994) (finding Oklahoma's waiver scheme in post-conviction cases did not constitute a
valid bar to federal consideration of ineffective assistance of counsel claims).

THE RESPONSE TO BRECHEEN V. REYNOLDS

The circuit's decision in Sellers v. Ward 5 illustrates the
restrictions under which the Tenth Circuit has determined it
must operate. In Sellers the circuit found that Sean Sellers had
presented evidence that he suffered from Multiple Personality
Disorder, which, if borne out in evidentiary proceedings, would
have merited relief under state post-conviction statutes. The
circuit characterized petitioner's claims as "supported by
significant evidence the person facing death for three murders is
not the person who committed the crime." 46 The court also
found that Sellers' evidence constituted newly discovered
evidence of actual innocence and that "the claim is grounds for
post-conviction relief under Oklahoma law., 47 However, in
Sellers' case, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in an
analysis significantly similar to that of its analysis of Robert
Brecheen's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, had
determined that the issue of newly discovered evidence was
waived because it had not been raised on direct appeal.48 It was
this waiver issue that proved to be ultimately dispositive of
Sellers' habeas petition. In analyzing Sellers' procedural
posture, the circuit found that
[t]he first hurdle Petitioner must overcome is that his
principal constitutional argument does not revolve about
trial error but about matters that occurred subsequently. He
maintains the Sellers II court mistakenly barred him from
airing his evidence of MPD because of its erroneous
interpretation of an Oklahoma statute relating to postconviction review. Assuming the contention is correct and
the Oklahoma court mistakenly construed the statute, the
error is one of state law not cognizable in habeas corpus
because "federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors
of state law." Although Petitioner indeed finds himself in a
judicially created "Catch 22," the dilemma is not one we
can reach through the limited access provided by our
jurisdiction.49
45. 135 F.3d 1333 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Sellers 111").

46. Id.
47. Id. n.3.
48. See Sellers v. State, 1995 Okla. Crim. App. 11, 5, 889 P.2d 895, 897 ("Sellers
IX'). Sellers' direct appeal was decided in Sellers v. State, 1991 Okla. Crim. App. 41, 809
P.2d 676.
49. Sellers, 135 F.3d at 1339 (citations omitted).
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In citing Matthews, the court apparently disregarded the
second half of the Matthews analysis-an analysis that would
have been particularly useful to Sellers in this instance. After
making its statement in Matthews with regard to the petitioner's
claims that a state court evidentiary ruling was invalid, the Tenth
Circuit then applied another analysis to Matthews' claims, and
stated:
Alternatively, Mr. Matthews argues that the trial court's
exclusion of the Cardenas boys' statements offends his
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. We
review due process challenges to state evidentiary rulings
only for fundamental unfairness. °
The implication of this holding is that, contrary to the
stated holding of Sellers III, the Tenth Circuit did not lack
jurisdiction to correct the "judicially created 'Catch 22' in
which Sellers found himself, but simply declined to exercise it.
Sellers III is not the only instance in which the Tenth
Circuit has demonstrated an inclination to avoid analysis of the
substantive due process concerns that are implicated by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' haphazard application of
procedural default rules and standards of review. In Brewer v.
Reynolds5 the Tenth Circuit joined six other courts of appeals, 2
rejected the reasoning of the Eighth and Second Circuits,53 and
determined that it would unconditionally apply the harmless
error standard in habeas corpus proceedings established by the
Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson.4 In Brecht, four
members of the Court adopted a position that the "harmless
50. Matthews v. Price, 83 F.3d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
51. 51 F.3d 1519, 1529 (10th Cir. 1995).
52. See Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 953 (3d Cir. 1998); Kyger v. Carlton,
146 F.3d 374, 382 (6th Cir. 1998); Hogue v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 466, 499 (5th Cir. 1997);
Curtis v. Duval, 124 F.3d 1, 6 (lstCir. 1987); Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1140-41
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Horsely v. Alabama, 45 F.3d 1486, 1497 n.1I (11 th Cir. 1995).

The Seventh Circuit appears to have an internal conflict with regard to this issue. Compare
Enoch v. Gramley, 70 F.3d 1490, 1500 (7th Cir. 1995) with Tyson v. Trigg, 50 F.3d 436,

446-47 (7th Cir. 1995).
53. See Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 572 (8th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming that "[w]hen a

state court has not conducted a harmless error review, we must use the strict standard found
in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) in conducting harmless error review");
Lyons v. Johnson, 912 F. Supp. 679, 688-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affid, 99 F.3d 499 (2d Cir.
1996).

54. 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
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beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of review established in
Chapman v. California55 was not applicable to federal habeas
corpus proceedings. Justice Rehnquist, writing for four justices,
found that the standard established in Kotteakos v. United
States5 -whether the constitutional error complained of "had
substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict"-should instead be applied in federal habeas
cases. Four members of the Court dissented, and it was Justice
Stevens' concurring opinion that determined the outcome. 7
The specific question on which the circuits disagree about
Brecht is whether its more restrictive standard of review applies
in cases in which no Chapman harmless error analysis has been
conducted in state court proceedings. The reason for the split
among the circuits is Justice Rehnquist's policy justification for
the more difficult Brecht standard. Justice Rehnquist wrote,
"The reason most frequently advanced in our cases for
distinguishing between direct and collateral review is the State's
interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct
review within the state court system."58 Issues of comity,
federalism, and the importance of maintaining the prominence
of the trial process were also considered. Justice Rehnquist then
found that
[i]n light of these considerations, we must decide whether
the same harmless error standard that the state courts
applied on direct review of petitioner's Doyle claim also
applies in this habeas proceeding. We are the sixth court to
pass on the question whether the State's use for
impeachment purposes of petitioner's post-Mirandasilence
in this case requires reversal of his conviction. Each court
that has reviewed the record has disagreed with the court
before it as to whether the State's Doyle error was
"harmless." State courts are fully qualified to identify
constitutional error and evaluate its prejudicial effect on the
trial process under Chapman, and state courts often occupy
a superior vantage point from which to evaluate the effect
of trial error. For these reasons, it scarcely seems logical to
55. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
56. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
57. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justices White, Blackmun,
O'Connor, and Souter were the four dissenting Justices.
58. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635.
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require federal habeas courts to engage in the identical
approach to harmless error review that Chapman requires
state courts to engage in on direct review. 59

The problem in application of this holding occurs when no
state court has applied harmless error analysis to the
constitutional claims raised. This situation has occurred often in
Oklahoma because of the waiver rules discussed above.
A federal habeas corpus action filed under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 is the single legal mechanism available to a prisoner facing
the death penalty through which he can litigate unconstitutional
error by the state court. "Congress has recognized that federal
habeas corpus has a particularly important role to play in
promotinE fundamental fairness in the imposition of the death
penalty." In addition, death penalty cases implicate not only
due process concerns, but issues of systemic reliability in
sentencing concerns under the Eighth Amendment.6'
The current concern is whether, in the wake of the passage
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,62
and their interpretation of Supreme Court decisions such as
Brecht, the federal courts will choose to retain the authority to
correct the failures of the state court system where that system
re-couches its historic waiver jurisprudence in terms of
substantive review. As the current status of the Oklahoma
system demonstrates, problems exist in state court process that

59. Id. (citations omitted).
60. McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994).

61. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
62. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2261 (West Supp. 1999); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994)
("AEDPA"). The Tenth Circuit has found that under the terms of the AEDPA,
[i]f the claim was not heard on the merits by the state courts, and the federal
district court made its own determination in the first instance, we review the
district court's conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact, if any, for
clear error. But when reviewing a claim already decided by the state courts on
the merits, we are bound to deny relief unless the state court's decision "was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court" or "resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Berget v. Gibson, 188 F.3d 518 (10th Cir. 1999) (table) (text at Berget, No. 98-6381, 1999
WL 586986, at *4 (10th Cir. Aug. 5, 1999) (citations omitted). The court also noted that,
"[q]uite simply, the 'AEDPA increases the deference to be paid by the federal courts to the
state court's factual findings and legal determinations."' Id. (citing Houchin v. Zavaras,
107 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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can only be protected in subsequent federal habeas corpus
proceedings. Failure by the federal courts to retain and exercise
their authority to remedy those problems will result in a system
in which fundamental due process rights are not only
unprotected, but potentially cannot even be litigated. Adoption
of a federal judicial philosophy that assumes state courts are
applying federal constitutional standards, without requiring an
evaluation in each case as to whether those standards were in
fact applied, equals an abdication of the federal courts'
responsibility to ensure the fundamental fairness of the process
by which condemned petitioners have been found guilty and
sentenced. Adoption of a philosophy of limiting jurisdiction
over fundamentally unfair state court process, such as the
determination made by the state court in Sellers II and
permitting petitioners' otherwise valid claims to be destroyed by
judicially created "Catch 22's" does nothing to increase
confidence in the process. Instead, such a choice would indicate
a willingness to permit state courts to engage in exactly the type
of "case-by-case" analysis contemplated by the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, without recourse for petitioners to
firmly established rules of procedure and review in state court
proceedings.

